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Transitive tasks are important for understanding how children develop socio-cognitively. However,
developmental research has been restricted largely to questions surrounding maturation. We asked 6-, 7-
and 8-year-olds (N= 117) to solve a composite of ﬁve different transitive tasks. Tasks included conditions
asking about item-C (associated with the marked relation) in addition to the usual case of asking only
about item-A (associated with the unmarked relation). Here, children found resolving item-C much easier
than resolving item-A, a ﬁnding running counter to long-standing assumptions about transitive reasoning.
Considering gender perhaps for the ﬁrst time, boys exhibited higher transitive scores than girls overall.
Finally, analysing in the context of one recent and well-speciﬁed theory of spatial transitive reasoning, we
generated the prediction that reporting the full series should be easier than deducing any one item from
that series. This prediction was not upheld. We discuss amendments necessary to accommodate all our
earlier ﬁndings.
Keywords: Children’s reasoning; Gender; Markedness; Mental Seriation; Transitive deductions.
If we know John is taller than David, and David is
taller than Eric, then we can deduce Eric must be
shortest of all three, that John is tallest and also
that David is intermediate in height. This thought
process is often termed relational reasoning,
linear syllogistic reasoning or transitive reasoning
(Bonnefond, Castelain, Cheylus, & Van der Henst,
2014; Clark, 1969; Guez & Audley, 2014; Piaget,
1965; Sternberg, 1980; Wright, 2001). In more
abstract terms, we can say “if A > B, and B >C, it
then follows that A>C”. This kind of deductive
reasoning is basic to the development and normal
functioning of many socio-cognitive processes—
from mathematical and text-processing skills,
through friendships and the trusting of other
people, to generalisations of racial prejudice
(Coleman et al., 2010; Favrel & Barrouillet, 2000;
Kim & Song, 2011; Markovits, Dumas, & Malfait,
1995; Ragni & Knauff, 2013; Sedek, Piber-
Dabrowska, Maio, & Von Hecker, 2011). For
example, one might generally trust Mary more
than Sally, but might trust Sally more than Trudy.
Applying what Halford and Andrews (2004) have
called “the transitivity principle”, it follows that
in a choice between Mary and Trudy, one should
generally trust Mary.
Three-term problems such as our earlier examples
became signiﬁcant to psychologists in around 1921,
when Piaget investigated the age at which they
tended ﬁrst to be solved by children (see Guez &
Audley, 2014; Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010;
Piaget, 1965; Piaget & Garcia, 1991; Piaget, Grize,
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Szeminska, & Bang, 1977). However, generally, these
tasks meet with a different fate in cognitive research
versus in developmental research. In cognitive
research, three-term tasks are embraced alongside
other tasks, as useful for assessing the simplest case
of relational reasoning (Clark, 1969; Evans, News-
tead, & Byrne, 1993; Knauff, 2009; Wright &
Dowker, 2002;Wright, Robertson, &Hadﬁeld, 2011).
In that tradition, Knauff and May (2006) intro-
duce a theory of reasoning that utilises a spatial
array framework (cf. De Soto, London, & Handel,
1965) with mental models theory (cf. Johnson-
Laird, 1983), and espouses that there are three
basic stages of reasoning with such problems: (1)
Visualising the items in each of the two premises
and also the relational-comparison used (e.g.
“taller than)”, achieved via processing in occipital
lobe. (2) Spatially representing the premises within
a single array regarding the relation in question,
largely due to processing in parietal lobe (e.g. John
>David > Eric). (3) Describing the array symboli-
cally, evaluating the inferential question asked (e.g.
“Who is tallest of all three males?)” and then inspect-
ing the symbolic series in memory in order to reach
the required answer, achieved by processing in pre-
frontal cortex within the frontal lobe. Neuroscience
evidence shows that, intriguingly, the ﬁnal stage
does not call on visuo-spatial information involving
occipital and parietal lobes (Knauff, 2009; Krawc-
zyk, 2012; but see also Wright, 2012). Additionally,
this stage may sometimes lead to constructing a
mental model that is indeterminate or invalid (e.g.
A blood relative of B, B blood relative of C, might
lead to A blood relative of C, when in fact the infer-
ence is indeterminate—Lazareva & Wasserman,
2010; Wright, 2001).
In linewith this theory,Reyna andBrainerd (1990)
had previously found that children’s transitive infer-
ence operates by reasoners using the premises to
generate gist and ﬂow information for the whole
series (e.g. “things get larger to my right)”, but
upon doing so, the verbatim premises are no longer
retained. Memory for antecedents is less durable
than gist representations; and so gist rather than
deductive coordination of premises as such is utilised
to solve for inferential comparisons. Knauff andMay
(2006) could be seen as adding to this distinction,
insofar as they found that if the verbatim premises
are visualised, this can actually interfere with the
reasoning process; the implication being that visual-
isation can make the premises more durable and
hence can cause interference with gist.
However, despite initial developments such as
Reyna andBrainerd’s theory, some developmentalists
argued that three-term tasks are invalid as a test of
children’s deductive inference-making (Bryant, 1998;
Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). To again use our initial
relation, when premise A>B is presented, the child
labels item-A as tall and item-B as short. When B>
C is presented, item-B is labelled tall and item-C
labelled short. Regarding inferring the tallest, item-
A was never labelled short in its premise, and so the
child always realises it is the tallest, but the child did
not call on transitivity or any kind of reasoning to
reach this conclusion (cf., Bryant & Trabasso, 1971).
Aside from the curious implication that three-term
tasks can be valid in research with adults, but not
research with children, we list just three of the many
further problems with the labelling conjecture.
First, advocates of labelling never presented
empirical evidence for their view. The only devel-
opmental study directly testing it found it not to
feature unless magnitude differences between
items are highly pronounced (Wright & Dowker,
2002; see also Guez & Audley, 2014 regarding
non-humans).
Second, the labelling view predicts that three-
term tasks are easier to solve than other competing
tasks said to index transitivity (e.g. Bryant &
Trabasso’s own ﬁve-term task using extensive train-
ing). However, Bryant’s own lab intimates that this
prediction is not upheld (compare 3-term paper of
Bryant & Kopytynska, 1976 versus paper on 5-
term extensive-training task of Bryant & Trabasso,
1971; see also Ameel, Verschueren, & Schaeken,
2007; Markovits & Dumas, 1999; Wright, 2012).
Note, tasks avoiding training just like Piaget’s
three-term task, but which utilise ﬁve-terms or
more, do appear more cognitively demanding than
Bryant and Trabasso’s task with 4–6-year-olds (e.g.
Andrews, 2010; Markovits et al., 1995; Wright &
Howells, 2008). That said, the Bryant and Trabasso
(1971) ﬁndings themselves have proven highly difﬁ-
cult to replicate with children at or near the age of
4 years (Holcomb, Stromer, & Mackay, 1997;
Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Wright, 2012).
Third, in well-controlled transitive studies, each
premise is typically presented ﬁrst 50% of the
time. Thus, 50% of the time item-B of premise B
>C is ﬁrst to be labelled tall, and so item-A of
the next (A > B) premise to be presented would
simply cause confusion, or lead to deletion of
item-B (Bonnefond et al., 2014), unless of course
the child already understands transitivity and can
re-order the premises and items deductively
(Ameel et al., 2007; Piaget & Garcia, 1991; Piaget
et al., 1977; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Wright &
Dowker, 2002).
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Labelling disputes aside for now, there are three
important issues in transitive research that have
received little attention to date: These are ecological
validity, gender and markedness. Regarding ecologi-
cal validity, transitive studies have tended to rely on
tasks with a single dimension such as height, speed
or weight (Markovits et al., 1995; Wright, Robert-
son, & Hadﬁeld, 2011). An over-reliance on only
one transitive relational-comparison, (e.g. “is better
than)” means that study ﬁndings could be tied to
one speciﬁc content (e.g. height but not weight),
rather than applying across transitive deductions
more generally (a distinction perhaps ﬁrst captured
by Piaget’s contrast between concrete versus formal
operational thought—e.g. Piaget & Garcia, 1991).
One solution is to rely on a large number of different
transitive relations and contexts across different
three-term tasks, to make possible a composite
measure of overall transitive capacity. However,
this precaution has rarely been taken (for useful
examples see Knauff & May, 2006; Markovits &
Dumas, 1999).
Gender may also impact on transitive perform-
ance, and yet it seems not to have been a focus of
any published study of transitive reasoning.
However, gender has been investigated in other
areas of cognitive development. One consistent
ﬁnding is that girls tend to outperform boys on
tasks that tap into verbal abilities (Mills, Ablard, &
Stumpf, 1993; Strand, Deary, & Smith, 2006).
Sternberg (1980) found that transitive reasoning
has a strong verbal component. Studies have also
investigated spatial reasoning, which was Sternberg’s
second component to transitive reasoning. Here, a
slight advantage to boys increases towards adoles-
cence (Hegarty, Keehner, Kooshabeh, & Montello,
2009; Strand et al., 2006).
Given that transitive reasoning is thought to be
partly reliant on children’s verbal processing (e.g.
solving out aloud—Sternberg, 1980; Trabasso,
Riley, & Wilson, 1975; Wright & Dowker, 2002),
we wonderedwhether, during development of deduc-
tive transitivity, girls might enjoy an advantage in
transitive reasoning. However, given that boys
gradually begin to enjoy an advantage in spatial
reasoning, and some theorists maintain that spatial
competencies are important in transitive reasoning
(Brunamonti, Genovesio, Carbe, & Ferraina, 2011;
Knauff & May, 2006; Trabasso, 1977; Wright,
2012), it may well be that it is boys who show a
transitive reasoning advantage as transitivity
increasingly matures.
Kallio (1988) proposed that there are four refer-
ence points when making a transitive inference. To
use again our initial example of people’s heights,
“tall” is the main adjective and is the primary refer-
ence point from which children make deductions.
“Short” is the secondary reference point, as it is
the converse of the primary reference point and is
deﬁned in relation to that point (Knauff & May,
2006). Short is a “marked” relational adjective com-
pared to tall, which is described as unmarked
(Andrews, 2010; Clark, 1969; Maybery, Bain, &
Halford, 1986; cf., Piaget, 1965; Sternberg, 1980;
Wright, 2001).
Generally speaking, markedness is a term psy-
cholinguists and logicians use to refer to the
relationship between two adjectives which can be
taken to be the polar opposite of one another
(e.g. happy versus sad, big versus small, fast
versus slow, heavy versus light, etc.—Chen, Lu, &
Holyoak, 2014; cf., Clark, 1969). In the context of
transitivity, a marked adjective may form part of
the relational-comparative (Andrews, 2010;
Maybery et al., 1986). However, usually, its
purpose will be to attach to the noun given in the
pairwise comparison (e.g. “David is short” relative
to John; or “the little mouse versus the big
elephant”—Chen et al., 2014; Wright, 2001).
Following the latter, as here the relational adjective
is speciﬁcally used to describe (i.e. is attached to) a
concrete entity (i.e. an actual item which in linguistic
terms constitutes a noun), we here refer to the associ-
ated items as most marked (item-C) versus most
unmarked (item-A) in terms of that relational adjec-
tive, in the interests of both space and convenience.
In agreeing that markedness is a factor that
affects the difﬁculty of reasoning with transitive
relations, Andrews argues that this is “presumably
because marked forms are ﬁrst converted to the
unmarked form” (Andrews, 2010, p. 935). In line
with this view, when studies pose the transitive ques-
tion in terms of the unmarked item, this leads to
higher accuracy during premise acquisition as well
as transitive responding (Acuna, Eliassen,
Donoghue, & Sanes, 2002; Andrews, 2010; Carme-
sin & Schwegler, 1994; Holcomb et al., 1997;
Titone, Ditman, Holzman, Eichenbaum, & Levy,
2004). Statistical models, mathematical models and
computational simulations encapsulate this
unmarked advantage (Breslow, 1981; De Lillo, Flor-
eano, & Antinucci, 2001; Wu & Levy, 2001). That
said, when half of adults are taught the series in
terms of the unmarked relation, with the other half
taught in terms of the marked relation, there is no
difference in either learning or transitive responding
between these two groups (Lazareva & Wasserman,
2010). Clearly, these two sets of ﬁndings are
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discrepant with one another. Markedness, then, is in
need of further investigation.
Two further elements of Kallio’s theory are ter-
tiary versus quaternary reference points. The tertiary
reference point is the understanding that, for example
A is taller than B or B is taller than C. Last and most
demandingly, a quaternary reference point is the
coordination of three items A > B >C. For example,
coordinating John is taller than David, but David is
taller than Eric (see Halford, Wilson, & Phillips,
1998 for similar conception). Kallio’s theory inti-
mates that reporting of all three items should be no
better than reporting the marked or unmarked item,
because both involve integration and the quaternary
reference point. This prediction runs contrary towhat
we may derive from Knauff ’s (2009) theory. Knauff
(2009) asserts that premise reordering occurs in
stage 2 of 3, “before” the premises are formed into a
symbolic mental model for scanning, but it does not
itself involve deduction (see also Bonnefond et al.,
2014). Thus, all three items are already present in
the correct order at stage 2, but the answering of a
question about, say, which item is shortest must
await stage 3, where the mental model is constructed
and consulted.
Summary of aims
For a more ecologically valid index of children’s
transitive reasoning, we used a composite measure
comprising ﬁve three-term tasks which referenced
different contents. We considered gender in our ana-
lyses, for the ﬁrst time in published transitive
research. Additionally, we included a condition
asking children about item-C, additional to a con-
dition asking about item-A, to test the commonly
held belief that performance on the unmarked
item-A is superior, again for the ﬁrst time. Finally,
we included a further condition asking children to
report the entire transitive series, to determine if
reporting all three items in order (mental seriation)
is easier or harder than reporting the end items
(Kallio, 1988; Knauff, 2009).
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 117 children of 5–8 years, from
schools local to the research institution. The children
were predominantly Caucasian and from working
and middle-class backgrounds. Children from Year
1, Year 2 and Year 3 took part, with 39 children in
each of these groups. The associated ages were
6 years (M= 6.32, SD = 0.39), 7 years (M = 7.16,
SD = 0.33) and 8 years (M = 8.25, SD = 0.26). The
6-year-old group contained 19 girls and 20 boys,
for the 7-year-olds these were 20 and 19, respectively,
and for the 8-year-olds, these were 14 and 25. The
mean ages for the two genders were the same ( + or
− 0.10 years).
Materials
For each of our ﬁve tasks, there were two photo
picture cards, each one showing the relationships
between two objects. One picture always showed
an Object A in relation to Object B (A > B) and
the other picture always showed Object B in com-
parison to Object C (B >C ). The ﬁve tasks were
about animals, household items, cars, balls and
Finding Nemo; and each one is brieﬂy described
later. The photo-picture cards were made by photo-
graphing a background and then photographing the
objects. For the animal, household items and car
tasks, the pictures were cropped digitally using the
computer programme PhotoShop. Pictures for the
balls task were made by photographing the objects
on to white paper and the photos were simply digi-
tised and printed. The pictures for the Finding
Nemo task were made by photographing the
objects against an Under-The-Sea cartoon back-
ground, which had come with the toys when bought.
Additional to the two pictures, we presented one
instance of each of the actual toy objects themselves.
The physical objects were used by the children to
assist their responses. Within each of the ﬁve tasks,
the actual physical objects (items A, B andC ) as pre-
sented to the child were always the same ones
depicted in the pictures, but were all the same in
actual size. This was intended to help ensure that
the child relied on what the pictures told them and
not on the absolute visual information of the
actual objects (see Wright & Dowker, 2002).
Task 1 was adapted from Kallio (1988), and was
about animals (the items) and races (speed being
the transitive comparison). One picture showed a
sheep and a horse in a race, and the sheep won
(A >B). In another picture, the horse had a race
with the pig, and the horse won (B >C ).
Task 2 was adapted from Markovits and Dumas
(1999) and was about household items and tallness.
Here, the three objects were a ruler, a comb and a
toothbrush, respectively. In the pictures, the objects
were seen in pairs in a stationery holder, with a
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different portion of each protruding outside the
stationery holder.
Task 3 was also adapted from Markovits and
Dumas (1999) and used cars and length. In our
task, there were three cars: A red car, a black car
and a white car. Each picture showed one car
partly driven into a garage (partial occlusion)
whilst the other car was outside the garage (no occlu-
sion). The children were verbally told that the car in
the garage is longer than the car outside the garage.
Task 4 was adapted from Kallio’s (1988) task
about relative heights. It used balls which were
depicted as bouncing. Here, the experimenter
wanted to see which of the balls bounced the
highest. The balls were blue, pink and silver,
respectively.
Lastly, task 5 was a task about cartoon characters
in a race. Here, the cartoon characters were from the
ﬁlm Finding Nemo. The characters used were
Bubbles, Nemo and Dory.
Design
The study used a multi-factorial design. Independent
measures were the age group of the child and the
child’s gender. The level of markedness (unmarked
versus marked) were two levels of a single
repeated-measures factor. Separate analyses con-
sidered full-series reporting (i.e. asking for the
whole series A > B>C ) both in isolation and in
comparison to the average of the marked and
unmarked items. In each case, the Dependent Vari-
able was the participant’s score.
Procedure
Children were tested in a quiet space reserved just
outside the classroom. The ﬁve tasks were given in
a pre-randomised order. For each task, the left–
right spatial location of the two premises and also
the order of giving the three questions on the mark-
edness factor were also randomised, and the earlier
randomisations were achieved by following instruc-
tions on a pre-randomised ordering sheet. About
200 sheets were created, with a sheet selected at
random for each child at the start of that child’s
participation.
For each task, the two photo-picture cards were
placed on the table in front of the child simul-
taneously. The child was asked to describe each
picture, and stated what the objects were and what
the relation between them was. Thus, the
experimenter did not have to present any premises
verbally, and could reserve verbalisations for
conversational reasons only, whilst encouraging the
child’s own verbalisations (a technique that teachers
will be familiar with). The child was then asked for
the most unmarked item (e.g. which ball bounces
highest of all three balls). Here, the child responded
via a combination of voice, gesturing and touching
of the concrete objects or the items in the
photographs. Children were also asked for
the most marked item (e.g. which ball bounces the
lowest) and what the whole series was (e.g. from
highest to lowest).
Questions were asked in random order and each
answer was recorded on a response sheet. The test
session lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. Through-
out their participation, all objects and photographs
were continually available for inspection, thus any
memory loads were minimal. After completing all
ﬁve tasks, the child was thanked for his/her partici-
pation, and given a treat as previously agreed with
the class teacher.
RESULTS
For the unmarked condition, a score of 1 was given if
that condition had been responded to correctly, or a
0 if not. These scores were then summed over all ﬁve
tasks, to give a maximum cumulative score of 5. This
process was repeated for the marked condition and
the full-series condition. Unmarked versus marked
performance is summarised in Table 1, according
to gender and age group. A three-way mixed-
model analysis of variance (ANOVA) used factors
of markedness (2 levels), gender (2 levels) and age
group (3 levels). This and our other analyses used a
2-tailed hypothesis with an Alpha level of 0.05
unless otherwise speciﬁed.
Table 1 shows that performance in the unmarked
condition (identifying item-A) was around 5% lower
than for the marked condition (identifying item-C ).
The difference was statistically signiﬁcant (F(1, 111)
= 5.14, p= 0.03, Partial Eta2 = 0.04). Regarding
gender, boys tended to perform around 7% higher
than did girls (Table 1), with this difference also stat-
istically signiﬁcant (F(1, 111) = 4.22, p = 0.04,
Partial Eta2 = 0.04). Turning to age groups, there
was around a 10% improvement in performance
between the 6- and 7-year-olds, and a further 6%
improvement between ages 7 and 8 years, leading
to a signiﬁcant main effect of age (F(2, 111) = 7.51,
p < .01, Partial Eta2 = 0.12).
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Table 1 shows that a difference of 9% between
unmarked and marked conditions at age 6 years
was reduced to less than 2% at age 7 years.
However, it also shows a tendency for the difference
between unmarked andmarked conditions to remain
more or less stable between 7 and 8 years. The result
of these two differing proﬁles was an overall two-way
interaction effect that did not reach signiﬁcance (F(2,
111) = 2.05, p= 0.13, Partial Eta2 = 0.03). None of
the remaining interactions were statistically signiﬁ-
cant (Markedness ×Gender − F(1, 111) = 0.19, p=
0.67, Partial Eta2 < 0.01; Gender ×Age − F(2,
111) = 1.55, p= 0.22, Partial Eta2 = 0.03; Marked-
ness ×Gender × Age − F(2, 111) = 0.52, p= 0.59,
Partial Eta2 < 0.01).
Turning now to the full series, performance is
summarised in Table 2. We conducted a two-way
ANOVA with Age and Gender as factors, and the
full-series performance as the dependent variable.
The main effect of Gender was marginally signiﬁ-
cant (F(1, 111) = 3.56, p= 0.06, Partial Eta2 =
0.03). Age was statistically signiﬁcant (F(2, 111) =
8.13, p < .01, Partial Eta2 = 0.13). However, there
was no statistically signiﬁcant interaction between
age and gender for full-series performance (F(2,
111) = 0.65, p= 0.52, Partial Eta2 = 0.01).
In order to address the question of whether gener-
ating the full series was more demanding or less
demanding than answering for unmarked/marked
items, a further ANOVA compared performance
on the full-series condition versus mean performance
of the unmarked and marked items. Table 3 shows
that overall performance for mean markedness was
around 13% higher than for full-series reporting.
Gender was not included in this analysis because
our earlier analyses already conﬁrmed that gender
differences exist for the unmarked item, marked
item and the full series, but gender does not interact
with age or markedness. The present analysis
showed a statistically signiﬁcant main effect of con-
dition (Markedness versus Full-Series − F(1, 114) =
97.83, p< .01, Partial Eta2 = 0.46). There was also a
statistically signiﬁcant main effect of Age (F(2, 114)
= 9.07, p < .01, Partial Eta2 = 0.14). Furthermore,
there was a signiﬁcant two-way interaction
between condition and age, whereby the disadvan-
tage of the full-series condition compared to mean
markedness was around 18% at age 6 years and
decreased to 10% by age 8 years (F(2, 114) = 4.35,
p= 0.02, Partial Eta2 = 0.07).
Our ﬁnal set of analyses assessed children’s per-
formance against two criteria—random guessing
TABLE 1
Mean transitive performance by age-group gender and markedness
6-Year-olds (%) 7-Year-olds (%) 8-Year-olds (%) All years (%)
Gender female
Unmarked (A) 2.79 (0.26) 56 3.70 (0.25) 74 3.71 (0.30) 74 3.40 (0.16) 68
Marked (C ) 3.16 (0.21) 63 3.85 (0.20) 77 3.93 (0.24) 79 3.65 (0.13) 73
Overall 2.97 (0.21) 59 3.78 (0.20) 76 3.82 (0.24) 76 3.52 (0.13) 70
Gender male
Unmarked (A) 3.30 (0.25) 66 3.74 (0.26) 75 4.32 (0.22) 86 3.79 (0.14) 76
Marked (C ) 3.85 (0.20) 77 3.68 (0.21) 74 4.32 (0.18) 86 3.95 (0.12) 79
Overall 3.58 (0.20) 72 3.71 (0.21) 74 4.32 (0.18) 86 3.87 (0.11) 77
Gender both
Unmarked (A) 3.05 (0.18) 61 3.72 (0.18) 74 4.02 (0.19) 80 3.59 (0.10) 72
Marked (C ) 3.50 (0.15) 70 3.77 (0.15) 75 4.12 (0.15) 82 3.80 (0.09) 77
Overall 3.27 (0.14) 65 3.74 (0.14) 75 4.07 (0.15) 81 3.70 (0.09) 74
N for each age group = 39. Maximum average score for each cell = 5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
TABLE 2
Full-series performance by age and gender
6-Year-olds (%) 7-Year-olds (%) 8-Year-olds (%) All years (%)
Female 1.95 (0.31) 39 3.20 (0.30) 64 3.36 (0.36) 67 2.84 (0.19) 57
Male 2.80 (0.30) 56 3.37 (0.31) 67 3.76 (0.27) 75 3.31 (0.17) 66
Genders combined 2.37 (0.22) 47 3.28 (0.22) 66 3.56 (0.22) 71 3.07 (0.13) 61
N for each age group = 39. Maximum average score for each cell = 5. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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chance (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971) and restricted
guessing chance (Wright&Dowker, 2002). Addition-
ally, we adopted a basic psychophysics method for
determining whether the levels of performance
observed against our two criteria actually represent
a deductive transitive competence. This is based
around the notion that competent reasoners should
be at least as close to perfect inference performance
as to chance performance (a competence threshold
—Mueller & Pickering, 1970). If a participant
getting an answer wrong does so because they
confuse item-A with item-C, as maintained by
Bryant (1998), then random chance performance is
50%. The competence threshold therefore lays
midway between 50%and 100%,which is 75%.Alter-
natively, if the problem is between item-A and item-B,
rather thanAversusC (Wright&Dowker, 2002), then
we still end up with a competence threshold of 75%.
However, if we make the common assumption that
children who are not competent in transitive reason-
ing are not able to even partiallyorder the items of the
implied series (an assumption of Bryant & Trabasso,
1971), then we must hold that they guess among all
three items, rather than between only two of them
as described earlier. Consequently, random chance
performance is 33.3% rather than 50%, and its associ-
ated competence threshold is now midway between
33.3% and 100%, which is 67%.
We compared each group’s item-A performance
against these assumptions about chance perform-
ance and competence thresholds, using a series of
one-sample t-tests. The 6-year-olds were signiﬁcantly
above random chance (df = 38, t = 6.20, p< .01).
When we adopted the 50% 2-choice chance criterion
as outlined earlier, the 6-year-olds were still signiﬁ-
cantly above it (df = 38, t = 2.47, p= 0.02).
However, at the same time, they were signiﬁcantly
below the 75% competence threshold as deﬁned
against 2-choice chance (df = 38, t =−3.13, p< .01).
For the 7-year-olds, their item-A performance did
not differ signiﬁcantly from the competence
threshold deﬁned against 2-choice chance (df = 38,
t =−0.19, p= 0.85). The 8-year-olds were the only
group performing signiﬁcantly above the compe-
tence threshold deﬁned against 2-choice chance
(df = 38, t= 2.53, p= 0.01).
We repeated the earlier analyses for the full-series
questions, as these were the only questions requiring
transitive inferences to be computed within mental
space, with little potential cuing from the premise
pairs continually on display (Brainerd & Reyna,
1992; Wright & Dowker, 2002). We again contrasted
performance against both random chance and
2-choice chance. Note, as there are 6 ways of arran-
ging items A, B and C, random chance here was 1 in
6 (or 16.7%). However, if, as our previous analysis of
item-A performance leads us to suspect, reasoners
tend to dismiss item-C from being a candidate for
biggest item and then the issue is whether they
realise that they already have the means to select
between item-A and item-B, a more appropriate
comparison is against 2-choice chance just as before.
The 6-year-olds were signiﬁcantly above random
chance performance on the full series (df = 38, t =
2.80, p< .01), but were not signiﬁcantly below 2-
choice chance (df = 38, t =−0.45, p= 0.66). They
were, however, signiﬁcantly below the competence
threshold set against 2-choice chance (df = 38, t =
−5.33, p< .01).
The 7-year-olds were signiﬁcantly above 2-choice
chance (df = 38, t= 4.18, p< .01). However, they were
also signiﬁcantly below the 75% competence threshold
set against 2-choice chance (df = 38, t=−2.50, p=
0.02). The 8-year-olds were also signiﬁcantly above 2-
choice chance (df = 38, t= 5.58, p< .01). But, unlike
the 7-year-olds, they did not perform signiﬁcantly
below the 75% competence threshold based on the 2-
choice chance criteria (df = 38, t=−0.67, p= 0.51).
DISCUSSION
Children in the present study had the two premise
pairs continually in view, reducing mental processing
requirements (Ameel et al., 2007; Kallio, 1988; Riley
& Trabasso, 1974; Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh,
TABLE 3
Summary of mean items versus full-series performance
6-Year-olds (%) 7-Year-olds (%) 8-Year-olds (%) All years (%)
Item A,C 3.28 (0.15) 66 3.76 (0.15) 75 4.14 (0.15) 83 3.73 (0.09) 75
Full Series 2.39 (0.22) 48 3.28 (0.22) 66 3.62 (0.22) 72 3.10 (0.13) 62
Overall 2.83 (0.18) 57 3.52 (0.18) 70 3.88 (0.18) 78 3.41 (0.10) 68
N for each age group = 39. “Item A, C” refers to average of items A and C. Maximum average score for each cell = 5. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.
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1989; Wright & Howells, 2008). Nevertheless, we
found transitive reasoning to be quite demanding
for 6-year-olds. This ﬁnding is at odds with labelling
theorists (e.g. Bryant, 1998), who would have
expected item-A performance to approach ceiling.
In line with developmental three-term task advo-
cates (e.g. Piaget et al., 1977), we found a substantial
improvement in resolving item-A between 6 and 8
years (Artman & Cahan, 1993; Castle &
Needham, 2007; Wright, 2006; Wright et al., 2011).
Markovits et al. (1995) showed that 4- and 5-year-
olds tend to guess randomly when solving for item-A
on three-term tasks. In an additional study (Wright
et al., 2011), we conﬁrmed this for 5-year-olds but
6-year-olds employed an intermediate strategy yield-
ing better performance. Our present data reconﬁrm
that by 6 years, children are not basing their transi-
tivity judgements on random chance. Rather, they
appear to resolve item-C. From that point, they
use a combination ofA:B guessing and genuine tran-
sitive judgements. By 8 years, children now routinely
appreciate the need to coordinate both given pre-
mises in order to fully solve for item-A; and their
increasing ability to successfully do this leads to per-
formance now starting towards perfect performance.
This is suggestive of phase-like development in tran-
sitive reasoning—1, random chance; 2, an inﬂuence
of A:B guessing; 3, transitive competence (Wright,
2006; Wright & Dowker, 2002; see also later).
Turning to gender, we report for the ﬁrst time in
transitive research, that there was an overall advan-
tage to one gender (boys). However, there was no
systematic change in the advantage of boys across
our three age groups either with age or with level
of markedness. The overall advantage of boys on
our tasks may be due to spatial abilities taking pri-
ority over verbal abilities between ages 6 and 8
years (Brunamonti et al., 2011; Hegarty et al.,
2009; Strand et al., 2006). An importance of
spatial processing to adult’s transitive reasoning
has recently been conﬁrmed in two experimental
studies of reaction-time (Brunamonti et al., 2011;
Demarais & Cohen, 1998) and two brain imaging
studies, one using a visual transitive task and the
other using an auditory transitive task (Fangmeier
& Knauff, 2009; Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff, &
Sloutsky, 2006). An implication for cognitive exper-
imental research with children is that spatial tasks
utilising high visual processing of the relation can
interfere with construction of the mental model of
the transitive series (Knauff & May, 2006), and
hence at least in theory, it should be possible to
reverse the gender advantage we have found here.
This will be the subject of our future developmental
research. But what is already clear is that transitive
studies should begin to include analyses of gender
effects.
As well as gender, another largely previously
underresearched issue in transitive reasoning is
markedness (which we operationalised here in
terms of the relation supporting item-A’s position
in the series versus that of item-C). On this issue,
we acknowledged Trabasso’s (1977) unmarked-item
superiority position. That said, neither our ﬁndings
here nor those of a number of other investigators
seem to support that view (De Lillo et al., 2001;
Wu & Levy, 2001). Presently, we have found that it
was the most marked item of our transitive series
(item-C ) that resulted in highest performance,
rather than the unmarked item (item-A). This
ﬁnding appears not to have been explicitly reported
previously. However, a number of published studies
do present data which at least intimate a marked
item superiority (e.g. see data tables in Favrel &
Barrouillet, 2000; Frank, Ruby, Levy, & O’Reilly,
2005; Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010; Moses,
Villate, & Ryan, 2006; Siemann & Delius, 1996;
Wright & Dowker, 2002; Wright & Howells, 2008).
The greater prominence of the marked (C ) item
implies that the transitive series is constructed start-
ing from this item, rather than from the most
unmarked end of the series as previously assumed.
Comparative transitive theorists could object that
markedness is a decidedly human phenomenon and
yet equivalent effects have been found in non-
humans (e.g. Eichenbaum, 2001; Higa & Staddon,
1993). However, such effects may be due, not to
deduction as such, but rather to perceptual or associ-
ative capacities fed by extensive training, as present
in many species (Coleman et al., 2010; Premack,
2007; Siemann & Delius, 1996). Both in studies
with humans and those with non-humans, associat-
ive (also known as reinforcement) accounts may be
controlled for (e.g. Allen, 2006; Lazareva &
Wasserman, 2010; Yamazaki, 2004). Importantly,
though, reinforcement issues cannot be ascribed to
the present study, because we did not train
(reinforce) children on any premise, and both
premises were actually in full view throughout each
task.
Earlier we summarised Knauff ’s (2009) transitive
theory as stating that deduction occurs in stage 3,
where the mental model is formed symbolically.
Here, transitive responses are reached by traversing
this model and inspecting it to answer the speciﬁc
question asked (e.g. “Who is the tallest?)”. This
theory intimates that the entire series is set out
both spatially and symbolically at a point in time
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that is before any question is asked, and so, simply
reporting the entire series should be easier than the
reasoner having to inspect it to answer a question
about any one item (e.g. item-A or C ). ANOVA
showed that reporting the full series was far more
difﬁcult than answering for item-A or C. This
ﬁnding is more in line with Kallio’s (1988) theory,
which proposed that integrating both premises to
realise the transitive series constitutes a quaternary
level of representation, the most demanding
(highest) level for transitive relations (see also
Halford et al., 1998).
One might argue that any direct comparison
between single items versus the full series is invalid,
because random chance performance is different in
these respective cases. We would ﬁrst state that it is
not possible to test the predictions we generated
from Kallio’s versus Knauff ’s theory, without
somehow directly comparing single item against
full series. Next, we would point out that, in any
case, our ﬁnal analyses indicate that children do
not simply go from random chance to competent
performance; and indeed, random chance is not
even an issue for 6–8-year-olds. Rather, in the case
of both individual items and the full series, the
issue is about moving from a level reﬂecting
2-choice chance (i.e. the child having difﬁculty dedu-
cing between the two items that had been given a
positive label). For both individual items and the
full series then, the most appropriate level of
chance for 6–8-year-olds is the same (50%), and
the competence threshold set against this level is
75%. Thus, we would argue that it is legitimate to
directly compare single items versus the full series
to these levels.
Our ﬁnal analyses showed that the 6-year-olds
were better than 2-choice chance for item-A, but
not for the full series, and did not reach competence
in either case. The 7-year-olds, although above
2-choice chance in both instances, reached compe-
tence for item-A, but not for the full series. The 8-
year-olds were again above 2-choice chance, and
were also above the competence threshold for item-
A, although reaching but not exceeding it for the full
series. This reconﬁrms that full-series performance
lags behind item-A performance. Indeed, our data
suggest that this lag is equivalent to approximately 1
year’s cognitive development (see Table 3 earlier).
Can we explain the greater difﬁculty of full series
within the three-level structure of Knauff ’s theory
(e.g. Knauff, 2009; Knauff & May, 2006)? For
Piaget et al. (1977), deductive transitivity is largely
about understanding and embracing that the middle
term (e.g. item-B) can have two relative values (one
againstA and the other againstC ), and can therefore
be used to link item-A indirectly to item-C. This rep-
resents a cognitive concept that is acquired at around
7 years. In opposition to Piaget’s view of transitivity
being a challenging concept for some groups, some
(e.g. Bonnefond et al., 2014) argue that applying tran-
sitivity is trivial, and it is establishing the resultant
mental model that is demanding (e.g. Bonnefond
et al., 2014, p. 101). Others argue along similar lines
to Piaget on this issue. For example, Halford and
Andrews (2004) state that “the process of construct-
ing the ordered set representation is an important
part of the reasoning process, because it is there that
the transitivity principle has to be applied” (Halford
&Andrews, 2004, p. 126). Knauff (2009) summarised
brain research showing that integration occurs at
stage 2 rather than at stage 3. One implication is
that stage 3 may therefore be a post-transitive stage
more to do with re-describing what occurred at
stage 2 in symbolic terms plus performing an inspec-
tion of the re-described array which itself does not
approximate deduction (see Trabasso, 1977; Wright,
2001). An alternative is to posit that deduction actu-
allyoccurs both acrossKnauff ’s stages 2 and 3, rather
than being conﬁned to stage 3 only.
We favour the second alternative here, and have
previously reported brain research studies which
show that both pre-frontal cortex and parietal
cortex are involved in the deduction (Wright, 2012).
In behavioural terms, it is possible to construct a tran-
sitive-like series at stage 2, for a relation such as “is
next to”; but it must be accepted that only at stage
3 can the reasoner choose to accept or reject the resul-
tant symbolic model as transitive and therefore valid
(Lazareva & Wasserman, 2010). For instance, con-
sider A left of B, B left of C; this implies A left of C
(Knauff, 2009). This A:C relationship holds if A, B
and C are along a straight line from left to right.
But some reasoners might conceive of a situation
where they are not—for example, perhaps you some-
times eat with friends at dinner tables which are
round. The A:C comparison does not hold if A, B
and C are equidistant around such a table (Wright,
2001). Indeed, in this situation, the A:C relationship
is C left of A, not A left of C. If a reasoner constructs
only the linear mental model, then the A >C con-
clusion follows; but if s/he constructs both these
models, then s/he should hold that the A:C compari-
son is indeterminate without further disambiguating
information.
Our ﬁndings regarding single items versus full-
series reporting then do not necessarily refute
Knauff ’s (2009) three-stage spatial theory of transi-
tive reasoning. However, our ﬁndings do call for a
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closer look at the notion that deduction occurs only
in one stage: We suggest that it occurs across two
stages, one for applying transitivity to yield
premise integration, and the other to evaluate the
nature of the relation by constructing one or more
mental model of the integrated premises (Wright,
2001). The challenge now is to devise both
experimental and neuroscience studies capable of
testing between the two alternative conceptions
offered here.
CONCLUSIONS
We conducted a transitive study with 6–8-year-old
children intended to be more ecologically valid
than many previous studies in two ways. First, we
relied on a composite transitive score from ﬁve
different contents, rather than using just a single
transitive relation. Second, we avoided issues of
training and memory, by ensuring that the two pre-
mises were visible to the child at all times. Using
this procedure, we investigated four main issues.
On these issues, ﬁrst, we found that our more ecolo-
gically valid procedure still gave results quite typical
of other three-term tasks. Thus, the assumption from
labelling theorists (e.g. Bryant, 1998) that such tasks
are invalid because of being too easy, with children
solving for item-A via non-transitive labelling strat-
egies, was not supported. Second, we found a
gender difference for transitive reasoning. Speciﬁ-
cally, in line with their supposed superior spatial
abilities, boys presented higher levels of transitive
performance than did girls. It is therefore worth
including analyses of gender in future transitive
studies. Third, developmental research has tended
to assert that item-A, the item uniquely associated
with the marked relation, is the pivot of the transitive
series; being solved both ﬁrst plus at the highest level
of all items in the series. However, contrary to this
assumption, it was our marked item-C that was
associated with higher performance than our
unmarked item-A.
Finally, in line with Kallio’s (1988) relational
theory, we found that ordering the transitive series
(A > B>C ) is more difﬁcult than solving for item-
A. This suggests that a transitive deductive compe-
tence may be used to integrate the entire series,
rather than the series being integrated ﬁrst and
deduction applied purely to inspect that series to
solve for any items (contrast Knauff ’s, 2009 spatial
theory). Our ﬁnding suggests a minor amendment
to Knauff ’s theory: Deduction may occur across
two levels rather than just one. These are the
integration of premises into a transitive-like series
(stage 2), followed by the testing of the resultant
mental model (stage 3) plus the search for alternative
models that potentially render the series invalid or
ambiguous. Insofar as these ﬁndings and our
suggested amendment represent initial inroads,
they are open to further conﬁrmation or challenge.
However, regardless, it is hoped that our present
demonstrations open up further possibilities of
other aspects of transitive reasoning which hitherto
may have been underinvestigated.
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